66 FR 11256, February 23, 2001 A-351-806 ARP: 7/1/98- 6/30/99 Public Document Office IV, Group II: MEMORANDUM TO: Bernard T. Carreau, fulfilling the duties of Assistant Secretary for Import Administration FROM: Holly A. Kuga Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import Administration SUBJECT: Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Administrative Review of Silicon Metal from Brazil - 7/1/1998 through 6/30/1999; Final Results Summary We have analyzed the comments and rebuttal comments of interested parties in the 1998/99 administrative review of the antidumping duty order covering silicon metal from Brazil. As a result of our analysis, we have made changes from our preliminary results. We recommend that you approve the positions we have developed in the Discussion of the Issues section of this memorandum. Below is the complete list of the issues in this administrative review for which we received comments and rebuttal comments from parties: 1. Requirements for Revocation with Respect to Ligas de Aluminio S.A. ("LIASA") 2. Calculation of Home Market Imputed Credit Expenses for RIMA Industrial S.A. ("RIMA") 3. Total Adverse Facts Available ("FA") for Eletrosilex S.A. ("Eletrosilex") 4. Calculation of Home Market Imputed Credit Expenses for Companhia Brasileira Carbureto De Calcio ("CBCC") 5. Circumstance of Sale ("COS")Adjustment for CBCC 6. Calculation of Financial Expense Ratio for CBCC 7. CBCC's Consolidated Financial Statement 8. CBCC's Short-Term Income Offset 9. Allocation of CBCC's Indirect Labor Costs 10. Determination Not To Revoke with Respect to CBCC Background On August 4, 2000, the Department of Commerce (the "Department") published the preliminary results of administrative review of the antidumping duty order on silicon metal from Brazil. See, Silicon Metal From Brazil: Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and Notice of Intent Not to Revoke Order in Part, 65 FR 47960 (August 4, 2000) ("Preliminary Results"). The review covers five manufacturers, CBCC, LIASA, Eletrosilex , RIMA and Companhia Ferroligas Minas Gerais-Minasligas ("Minasligas"). The period of review ("POR") is July 1, 1998, through June 30, 1999. We invited parties to comment on our preliminary results of review. On October 2, 2000, we received case briefs from American Silicon Technologies, Elkem Metals Company, and Globe Metallurgical, Inc., (collectively "the petitioners"), and from CBCC, Eletrosilex, and LIASA. On October 16, 2000, we received rebuttal briefs from the petitioners and RIMA. On August 3, 2000, CBCC, RIMA, LIASA, and Minasligas requested a public hearing which was held on October 25, 2000. The Department has conducted this administrative review in accordance with section 751 of the Act of 1930, as amended ("the Act"). Changes Since the Preliminary Results Since the preliminary results, we have made the following changes in our calculations. 1. We recalculated RIMA's imputed home market credit expense using the Taxa Referential ("TR") rate instead of the interest rate provide by RIMA. 2. We recalculated the financial expense ratio in CBCC's cost of production ("COP") and constructed value ("CV") using total financial expenses without any reduction for "income from current assets." Discussion of the Issues Comment 1: Requirements for Revocation with Respect to LIASA LIASA argues that it has met the requirements for revocation because it has received zero or de minimis dumping margins for sales in commercial quantities over the last two administrative reviews and expects to receive a zero or de minimis margin in the final results of the current review. Moreover, LIASA states that the Department erred in its Preliminary Results, when it determined that LIASA has not sold silicon metal in the U.S. market in commercial quantities during the last three consecutive administrative reviews. According to LIASA, the fact that its sales volumes for the subject periods of review are not as large as its period of investigation ("POI") sales quantities is not dispositive of this issue. LIASA contends that fluctuations in sales volume and drop-offs in sales do not automatically disqualify LIASA from obtaining, or being eligible for, revocation of the subject antidumping duty order. LIASA cites to Pure Magnesium from Canada; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and Determination Not to Revoke Order in Part, 64 FR 50489, 50492 (September 17, 1999) (citing Professional Electric Cutting Tools from Japan: Preliminary Results of Antidumping Administrative Review and Intent to Revoke in Part, 64 FR 43346, 43351 (August 10, 1999), which states that "the Department will revoke antidumping duty orders as long as the sales used to demonstrate a lack of price discrimination are reflective of the companies' normal commercial experience." According to LIASA, it sells small quantities of silicon metal to its customers in its normal business operations. Specifically, LIASA notes that the vast majority of its home market sales, and a significant amount of its export sales, in the two most recently completed administrative reviews and the current review, are for small quantities. Thus, LIASA argues that the quantities it sold in the U.S. market during the subject PORs reflect its normal commercial experience and behavior. For this reason, LIASA argues that the Department should find that LIASA sold the subject merchandise in commercial quantities and revoke the antidumping duty order with respect to LIASA. LIASA also argues that there is no positive evidence to justify the continued necessity of the antidumping order to offset dumping. First, LIASA argues that the outlook for silicon metal demand and prices is on an upward trend. LIASA cites to a market study that predicts that silicon metal prices in the U.S. market has rebounded in 2000 and will increase steadily through 2005. Second, LIASA notes that this market study reports that the European Union was the largest market for silicon metal during the last five years and is expected to grow during the next several years. Thus, argues LIASA, there is no evidence that U.S. prices and demand will attract greater imports of silicon metal from Brazil in the future. Third, LIASA argues that during the relevant PORs, it was able to sell silicon metal in the U.S. market at prices at or above normal value ("NV"), even when the U.S. market experienced fluctuations in prices. LIASA notes that it received zero or de minimis dumping margins during the 1996 through 1999 administrative reviews. Moreover, LIASA argues that, during these reviews, it was able to increase its sales volume to the United States without dumping. Fourth, LIASA asserts that recent economic forecasts show that it is unlikely that Brazil will return to hyper-inflationary conditions that were prevalent during the early 1990s. Accordingly, LIASA claims that there is no indication that it will resume dumping due to inflationary conditions in the home market. In rebuttal, the petitioners argue that the Department correctly found in its preliminary determination that LIASA did not sell silicon metal in the United States in commercial quantities during the relevant PORs. According to the petitioners, the Department correctly compared the total sales volume from each of the relevant PORs to the total POI sales volume and found that the sales volumes during the relevant PORs did not meet the commercial quantities threshold. Regarding LIASA's argument that its U.S. sales of silicon metal during the applicable PORs were representative of its normal commercial experience, the petitioners note that LIASA's argument is based on the fact that most of LIASA's individual sales of silicon metal in its home market were of small quantities. The petitioners argue that it is the Department's practice to look to the aggregate volume of sales, rather than the volume of individual sales when analyzing whether a respondent sold subject merchandise in commercial quantities. Therefore, the petitioners assert that LIASA's small individual sales in its home market are irrelevant to this analysis. The petitioners also argue that the continued application of the antidumping duty order is necessary to prevent future dumping by LIASA. First, the petitioners state that the unfavorable economic conditions in the U.S. silicon metal market support the need to maintain an antidumping duty order on imports from LIASA. According to the petitioners, the U.S. silicon metal market experienced only a "slight" increase in demand between 1998 and 1999, and that this level of demand is still significantly below the record high from 1997. The petitioners also claim that the U.S. market prices declined during 1999 and, although the price rebounded in April 2000, weakened again in September 2000. Second, the petitioners contend that the United States is an attractive and natural export market for LIASA. The petitioners state that the large size of the U.S. market, its close geographic proximity to Brazil, and the comparatively high silicon metal prices (as compared to European prices) will encourage LIASA to increase exports to the United States should the order be removed. Furthermore, the petitioners assert that the fact that LIASA only produces silicon metal prevents it from responding to periods of low silicon metal prices by shifting its furnaces to the production of other products. Without the ability to convert its large capacity to other products, the petitioners state that LIASA would be likely to respond to falling silicon metal prices by dumping silicon metal in the U.S. market. Third, the petitioners assert that LIASA cannot compete in the U.S. market without dumping. According to the petitioners, LIASA received zero or de minimis dumping margins during the relevant PORs because its U.S. sales were in minuscule amounts and at artificially high prices. Department's Position: We agree with the petitioners that the requirements for revocation have not been met. Since no new arguments have been made concerning whether LIASA sold silicon metal in commercial quantities in the U.S. market during the relevant PORs, we have not changed our analysis from the Preliminary Results. Pursuant to section 351.222(d)(1) of the Department's regulations, we must determine whether the company requesting revocation sold the subject merchandise in commercial quantities in each of the three years forming the basis for the revocation request. In other words, the Department must determine whether the quantities sold during these time periods are reflective of the company's normal commercial activity. See, Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews and Determination To Revoke in Part Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products and Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate From Canada, 64 FR 2175 (January 13, 1999) ("Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Canada"). Sales during a POR which, in the aggregate, are of an abnormally small quantity, either in absolute terms or in comparison to an appropriate benchmark period, do not generally provide a reasonable demonstration that the respondent is capable of participating in the U.S. market without dumping. However, the determination as to whether or not sales volumes are made in commercial quantities is made on a case-by-case basis, based on the unique facts on the record of each proceeding. See, section 751(d) of the Act; 19 CFR 351.222; see, also Notice of Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and Determination Not to Revoke the Antidumping Duty Order: Brass Sheet and Strip from the Netherlands, 65 FR 750 (January 6, 2000) ("Brass from Netherlands"). In the present case, we compared LIASA's aggregate U.S. sales during each of the PORs to the six-month POI. The POI was used as an appropriate benchmark because it reflects sales activity without the discipline of an antidumping order in place. The comparison indicates that LIASA's sales to the U.S. market during the three above-mentioned PORs represent 0.69 percent, 12.77 percent, and 1.6 percent, of the U.S. sales during the POI, respectively. When the POI sales are annualized, the sales for each of the three consecutive PORs decline even further to approximately 0.35 percent, 6.38 percent, and 0.8 percent, respectively. In Brass from Netherlands, the Department did not revoke the order with respect to the particular respondent because the volume of merchandise sold to the United States was approximately two percent of the volume of merchandise sold in the benchmark investigative period. See, id. at 752. Similarly, in the most recently completed segment of this proceeding, the Department denied revocation for CBCC because it failed to meet the commercial quantities threshold, i.e., CBCC's aggregate sales during one of the three- consecutive years forming the basis for revocation, represented approximately two percent of the sales volume sold during the POI. See, Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review: Silicon Metal From Brazil, 65 FR 7497 (February 15, 2000) ("1997-1998 Silicon Metal"). In the instant review, we find that in the 1996-1997 and 1998-1999 PORs, LIASA's sales to the United States were significantly lower, as a percentage of its POI sales, than those discussed in the cases mentioned above. After review of the criteria outlined at sections 351.222(b) and 351.222(d) of the Department's regulations, the Department's practice, the comments of the parties, and the evidence on the record, we have determined that the requirements for revocation have not been met. Based on the results of this review and the final results of the two preceding reviews, LIASA has not demonstrated three consecutive years of sales in commercial quantities. Therefore, because LIASA has not sold subject merchandise in commercial quantities during each of the three consecutive PORs, we are not revoking the antidumping duty order with respect to LIASA. See, Memorandum Regarding "Eighth Administrative Review: Commercial Quantities," dated July 30, 2000. Because a threshold requirement to qualify for revocation has not been met, the Department has not addressed the issue of whether the continued application of the antidumping duty order is necessary to offset dumping with regard to LIASA. Comment 2: Calculation of RIMA's Home Market Imputed Credit Expenses The petitioners, citing Import Administration Policy Bulletin 98.2 (February 23, 1998) ("Policy Bulletin 98.2"), argue that when a respondent has no short-term borrowings in the currency of the transaction, the Department should calculate home market credit expenses "using publicly available information, with a preference for published average short-term lending rates." According to the Notice of Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; Ferrosilicon from Brazil, 62 FR 43504, 43509 (August 14, 1997) ("Ferrosilicon from Brazil"), the petitioners assert that in Brazilian cases when short-term borrowings are unavailable, the Department, which has found the TR to be "a benchmark comparable to a prime rate published by the Bank of Brazil," opts to use the TR rate. The petitioners state that for its home market imputed credit expenses, RIMA used an interest rate derived from the short-term lending rates of the Brazilian Bank, Bradesco. The petitioners argue that the Department's use of this rate in the preliminary results was in error, because RIMA did not demonstrate that it had short term borrowings from Bradesco at the published rates. The petitioners assert that the use of the Bradesco rate understates RIMA's margin because it is a higher rate than the TR. Therefore, the petitioners assert that the Department should recalculate RIMA's home market imputed credit expenses using the TR rate. RIMA, citing Policy Bulletin 98.2, argues that publicly available information should be used when determining a surrogate interest rate. RIMA argues that the three criteria set forth in Policy Bulletin 98.2 should be used when evaluating a surrogate rate: 1) the surrogate rate should be reasonable; 2) it should be readily obtainable and predictable; and 3) it should be a short-term interest rate actually realized by borrowers in the course of "usual commercial behavior." RIMA argues that the interest rate it used to calculate its imputed credit costs fits this criteria. RIMA states that the interest rate reported by its bank represents a proper commercial lending rate. RIMA argues that its use of its bank's published interest rates is further supported by LMI-La Metalli Industriale, S.p.A. v. United States, 912 F.2d 455, 460-461 (Fed. Cir.1990) ("LMI") where the court ruled that credit cost should conform with commercial reality and be based on reasonable and commercial behavior. In addition, RIMA notes that Policy Bulletin 98.2 does not preclude the Department from using average rates that are supported by a statement from a commercial bank. RIMA states that a comparison between its bank's published rates and the International Monetary Fund's ("IMF's") average commercial rates substantiates its bank's rates as being consistent with market rates. RIMA argues that if the Department were to use the TR rate to calculate RIMA's credit costs, it would be contrary to the ruling in LMI because the TR does not conform with commercial reality. RIMA acknowledges that the Department has used the TR rate to calculate credit in past Brazilian cases, but argues it was only because there was insufficient evidence to support a better alternative. Therefore, pursuant to Policy Bulletin 98.2, RIMA urges the Department to use its reported interest rate because it is reflective of short term commercial lending practices in Brazil. However, RIMA argues that in the alternative, if the Department chooses to reject its reported interest rate, it should use the average rate published by the IMF. RIMA states that in Primary Steel, Inc, et al. V. United States, 834 F. Supp.1374,1382 (CIT 1993), the CIT upheld the Department's use of the IMF's average rate to determine credit costs. In addition, RIMA asserts that in other cases the Department has relied upon the IMF as a source of published interest rates. Stainless Steel Plate in Coils from South Africa, 64 FR 14459, 15468 (March 31, 1999). RIMA argues that the IMF rate satisfies all three criteria of Policy Bulletin 98.2 and represents commercial lending practices in Brazil. Therefore, RIMA argues that the IMF rates are a more appropriate benchmark of lending practices in Brazil than the TR rate. Department's Position: We agree with the petitioners. RIMA stated that it had short-term borrowings during the POR and provided a letter from its bank showing the bank's short-term lending rates. See, RIMA Sections A-D Supplemental Questionnaire Response at Attachment 6 (March 27, 2000). However, RIMA did not provide any documentation substantiating its statement that it had actual short-term borrowings from its bank at the rates reflected in the letter. Thus, we cannot conclude that the letter from the bank represents RIMA's actual commercial borrowing experience. Accordingly, we determine that RIMA failed to meet its burden to establish that it incurred short-term debt at a particular rate. The letter from RIMA's bank is insufficient record evidence to support RIMA's argument as to the surrogate lending rate the Department should use to calculate RIMA's imputed home market credit. The Department's Policy Bulletin 98.2 states "a letter from a bank purporting to establish the rate at which the respondent would have borrowed is often difficult to substantiate." Therefore, for these final results, consistent with Policy Bulletin 98.2 and our practice in the Brazil market, the Department will use the TR rate to calculate RIMA's imputed home market credit costs. This finding is consistent with Ferrosilicon from Brazil, where the Department stated that "in the absence of actual home market short-term borrowings and the lack of substantiated evidence that [the respondent] could have borrowed at the interest rates provided [for the record], we have used the TR rate as the interest rate in the calculation of imputed home market credit." In this case, RIMA stated that it incurred short-term debt, but there is no record evidence demonstrating the loan terms and the lending rate RIMA actually received. Although RIMA provided a letter to show the rate it may have received from its bank, we choose to use the TR rate, in accordance with past practice. This determination is also consistent with the finding in LMI that credit cost calculations should conform with commercial reality, because we are imputing credit costs based on the commercial reality of the TR rate and are applying that rate to a respondent that has not demonstrated its actual borrowing experience. However, RIMA has not demonstrated that use of the TR rate is not reasonable or is so inappropriate as to justify a change from our standard practice. Further in response to RIMA's argument that the Department should use the IMF rates as opposed to the TR rates, we note that in Ferrosilicon from Brazil, the Department agreed with the petitioners' argument that the "IMF rate is not a published commercial interest rate for short-term business loans, but rather a rate at which banks, not companies, can borrow." The Department's use of the TR rates to calculate credit in Ferrosilicon from Brazil and in these final results is further supported by Certain Cut-to- Length Carbon Steel Plate from Brazil , 62 FR 18486, 18487 (April 15, 1997) ("Carbon Steel Plate from Brazil"), where the Department determined that the TR rate was a benchmark comparable to a prime rate published by the Bank of Brazil and used the rate to recalculate the respondent's credit costs. Comment 3: Total Adverse FA for Eletrosilex Eletrosilex believes that the Department erred in assigning a total adverse FA rate to Eletrosilex in the Preliminary Results. Eletrosilex states that in recent judicial decisions interpreting section 776(b) of the Act, the Court of International Trade ("CIT") has ruled that the Department must make an affirmative finding that the party failed to cooperate to the best of its ability before applying adverse FA. Citing Borden Inc. v. United States, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (CIT 1998) ("Borden"), Ferro Union, Inc., v. United States, 44 F Supp. 2d 1310 (CIT 1999) ("Ferro Union") and F.lli De Cecco di Filippo Fara S. Martino S.p.A. v. United States, 216 F.3d 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("De Cecco"), Eletrosilex notes that in these and in other cases, the CIT has repeatedly held that the Department's mere recitation that the party failed to respond was not sufficient grounds for applying total adverse FA. Eletrosilex maintains that to use an adverse inference in applying FA, the Department must make an additional finding that this failure to respond was due to "an unwillingness to cooperate, rather than simply an inability, to cooperate." See Borden, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 1247. Eletrosilex states that the CIT recently overruled the Department's application of total adverse FA to Eletrosilex in Silicon Metal from Brazil: Notice of Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 64 FR 6305 (February 9, 1999) ("1996-1997 Silicon Metal") which, according to Eletrosilex, involved virtually identical facts to the current review. See American Silicon Technologies et. al. v. United States, No 99-03- 00149, 2000 SL 1180274 (CIT July 17, 2000) ("American Silicon"). Eletrosilex points out that in American Silicon the CIT held insufficient the Department's reasoning that adverse FA was warranted because Eletrosilex failed to respond to two supplemental questionnaires. Therefore, according to Eletrosilex, the CIT concluded that the Department did not make the necessary finding that Eletrosilex failed to respond to the best of its ability. Further, the CIT also noted that the Department "did not give adequate consideration to Eletrosilex's claim that management and staffing changes rendered it unable to respond." Id. Similarly in this case, Eletrosilex contends, the Department failed to meet the requirements of section 776(b) of the Act, because it did not make the required additional finding that Eletrosilex did not act to the best of its ability. As in 1996-1997 Silicon Metal, Eletrosilex argues, the Department merely repeated that Eletrosilex failed to respond to the supplemental questionnaire as its justification for applying an adverse inference. Eletrosilex notes that in its December 2, 1999, questionnaire response it stated that the company was facing serious financial misfortunes, frequent changes in personnel, loss of key personnel and lack of human resources. See, Eletrosilex December 2, 1999, Questionnaire Response, p. A-8. Eletrosilex maintains that despite these extraordinary circumstances, it cooperated to the best of its ability in responding to the Department's request for information and provided a full response to the initial questionnaire in a timely manner. Eletrosilex argues that the fact that it was not able to respond to a supplemental questionnaire should not eclipse its cooperation in providing the earlier questionnaire response. Eletrosilex contends that the information placed on the record is sufficient for the calculation of a margin. Pursuant to section 782(e) of the Act, Eletrosilex claims, the Department must consider the information it submitted to determine the margin. Eletrosilex notes that although it was unable to provide audited financial statements, it is the Department's practice to use unaudited financial statements when respondents do not prepare audited financial statements. Eletrosilex further states that other deficiencies mentioned by the Department did not relate to any failure by Eletrosilex to submit the information originally requested, but pertain to additional Departmental requests for clarification and reconciliation of information already provided. Eletrosilex believes that, under the prevailing circumstances, the appropriate methodology for the Department would be to apply partial facts available only for the information the Department deems completely unusable. Eletrosilex alleges that, even if the Department continues to apply a dumping margin based on total FA, the rate that was applied to Eletrosilex in the Preliminary Results, 93.20 percent, should be revised because it is not reasonable or relevant. According to Eletrosilex, section 776(c) of the Act requires that the Department to corroborate, to the extent practicable, secondary information used as FA. To "corroborate" means that the secondary information has probative value. See, Statement of Administrative Action accompanying the URAA, H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994) ("the SAA"). Eletrosilex states that the Department must also ensure that the margin is relevant, not outdated, and rationally related to the respondent. See, Ferro Union, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 1335. Eletrosilex states that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC") interpreted this provision and stated that: [i]t is clear from Congress's imposition of the corroboration requirement in 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) that it intended for an adverse facts available rate to be a reasonably accurate estimate of the respondent's actual rate, albeit with some built-in increase intended as a deterrent to non-compliance. Congress could not have intended for Commerce's discretion to include the ability to select unreasonably high rates with no relationship to the respondent's actual dumping margin. See De Cecco, 216 F.3d at 1032. Following these guidelines, Eletrosilex notes, the Department did not make a supported finding that the rate applied to Eletrosilex in the Preliminary Results is relevant or reliable. Eletrosilex argues that the rate has no reasonable relationship to Eletrosilex's actual dumping margin and is grossly inconsistent with the Department's margin calculations for the other Brazilian silicon metal producers in recent years. Further, Eletrosilex argues that the rate is based on sales made in 1990, and, thus, is outdated and unreliable as a measure of Eletrosilex's actual dumping margin in the current POR. Furthermore, Eletrosilex states that the CAFC has stated that the purpose of section 776(b) of the Act "is to provide respondents with an incentive to cooperate, not to impose punitive, aberrational, or uncorroborated margins." See, De Cecco, 216 F.3d at 1032. Thus, Eletrosilex maintains that to continue to impose the punitive and aberrational Preliminary Results margin to Eletrosilex which has exhibited a substantial level of cooperation would be unduly harsh, in light of its effort to cooperate with the Department. In rebuttal, the petitioners contend that Eletrosilex did, in fact, fail to act to the best of its ability. The petitioners argue that, in conformity with the statute, the Department has consistently determined that a respondent has failed to act to the best of its ability when the respondent has failed to answer a questionnaire or has withdrawn from the review. See, e.g., Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts From Taiwan: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 64 FR 17,314 (April 9, 1999) ("CPLNs from Taiwan"); Brass Sheet and Strip from German: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 73 FR 42,823 (August 11, 1998). Further, the petitioners maintain that the Department has resorted to total adverse FA in a number of cases where a respondent, like Eletrosilex, responded to the Department's original questionnaire, but failed to respond to supplemental requests for information. See, Ferrovanadium and Nitrided Vanadium From the Russian Federation: Notice of Preliminary Results and Partial Recissions of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 62 FR 42,492 (August 7, 1997). The petitioners note that where respondents fail to answer questionnaires, the Department's normal practice is to apply adverse FA, as expressly authorized by the statute. See CPLNs from Taiwan. According to the petitioners, the CIT has upheld that practice. See, Helmerich & Payne, Inc. v. United States, __ CIT __, Slip. Op. 98-134; 24 F. Supp. 2d 304, 309 (CIT 1998) ("Helmerich & Payne"). The petitioners dispute Eletrosilex's claim that "the Department failed to meet the requirements of section 776(b) of the Act, because it did not make the required additional finding that Eletrosilex did not act to the best of its ability." See, Eletrosilex Case Brief at 4. According to the petitioners, it is clear that Eletrosilex did not act to the best of its ability because Eletrosilex willfully chose not to respond to the Department's supplemental questionnaire and failed to offer any explanation for its failure to respond. Also the petitioners take umbrage with Eletrosilex's argument that "the CIT has repeatedly held that the Department's mere recitation that the party failed to respond was not sufficient grounds for applying total adverse facts available" and Eletrosilex's contention that in American Silicon "the CIT concluded that the Department did not make the necessary finding that Eletrosilex failed to respond to the best of its ability." Id. at 4. The petitioners maintain that in all the cases cited by Eletrosilex, the responding party provided the Department with a plausible explanation for its failure to provide the requested information, and the CIT found that the Department should have determined whether the stated explanation was in fact the reason for the responding party's failure to produce the requested information. However, in this case, the petitioners argue that Eletrosilex has never offered any explanation for its failure to respond to the Department's supplemental questionnaire. Further, the petitioners point out that under its regulations, the Department has the discretion to accept information from interested parties at any point in the review. However, the petitioners state that even though Eletrosilex has had sufficient resources to participate in this case as evidenced by the filing of its Case Brief, Eletrosilex has still made no effort to provide the Department with the information requested in the supplemental questionnaire. The petitioners also dispute Eletrosilex's contention that the information Eletrosilex submitted in its questionnaire response is sufficient to calculate a margin. According to the petitioners, Eletrosilex has failed to provide the Department with critical financial information requested by the Department in the supplemental questionnaire. Without that critical information, the petitioners contend, the Department cannot calculate a reliable margin for Eletrosilex. The petitioners note that the Department has recognized that where a respondent's failure to provide requested information prevents the Department from fulfilling its statutory obligation to calculate an accurate margin, it must resort to total adverse FA. See, Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Vector Supercomputers from Japan, 62 FR 45,623 (August 28, 1997). Additionally, the petitioners maintain that in the Preliminary Results the Department selected the proper adverse FA rate for Eletrosilex. According to the petitioners, the statute expressly authorizes the Department to use a prior segment margin as adverse FA. See, section 776(b) of the Act. Further, the petitioners state that consistent with the statute, the Department has stated that it is its normal practice, in situations involving non-cooperative respondents, to select as adverse FA the highest margin from the current or any prior segment of the proceeding. See, CPLNs from Taiwan at 17,317. By way of refuting Eletrosilex's arguments regarding corroboration, the petitioners contend that both the SAA and House Report accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act state that the Department may use secondary information, such as a previously established margin, as adverse information even if the information's reliability cannot be corroborated by independent evidence. In addition, the petitioners state that the CAFC has recognized that high margins from prior segments of a proceeding are probative of current margins, e.g., see, Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1185, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("Rhone-Poulenc"). The petitioners point out that in Rhone-Poulenc, the CAFC held that the use of a high adverse margin "reflects a common sense inference that the highest prior margin is the most probative of current margins because, if it were not so, the respondent, knowing the rule, would have provided current information showing the margin to be less." Thus, the petitioners claim, consistent with Rhone-Poulenc, the Preliminary Results margin is the most probative of current margins because, if it were not so, Eletrosilex would have provided current information showing the margin to be less. Furthermore, the petitioners dispute Eletrosilex's citing of De Cecco in support of its argument that the 93.20 percent margin is not relevant. According to the petitioners, in De Cecco, the court rejected the dumping margin chosen by the Department as adverse FA because the rate was not a dumping margin calculated by the Department from a previous segment of the proceeding, but instead a rate proposed in the petition of the less-than- fair-value ("LTFV") investigation, which the court found had been discredited. In this case, however the rate chosen by the Department as adverse FA is a rate calculated by the Department in the LTFV investigation for a specific respondent. Accordingly, the petitioners contend that the rate selected by the Department is consistent with De Cecco. Department's Position: We agree with the petitioners. The Department finds that the use of FA is warranted under section 776(a) of the Act because Eletrosilex failed to provide information that has been requested by the Department. Moreover, we agree with the petitioners that the Department in the Preliminary Results properly used an adverse inference in applying FA, in accordance with 776(b) of the Act, because Eletrosilex failed to cooperate by not acting to the best of its ability in this case. Contrary to the arguments presented in its Case Brief, it is clear that Eletrosilex did not act to the best of its ability. Eletrosilex chose not to respond to the Department's March 2, 2000 supplemental questionnaire ("supplemental questionnaire"). In the Department's March 17, 2000 letter granting Eletrosilex a 15-day extension of time to respond to the supplemental questionnaire, we reminded Eletrosilex that "any information submitted after the applicable deadline will be considered untimely and may be returned to the submitter" and "[i]n such case, we may have to use the facts available...for the preliminary results in this review." See, Department's Extension Letter to Eletrosilex, dated March 17, 2000. Despite our warning, Eletrosilex never responded to the supplemental questionnaire. Further, Eletrosilex did not ask for additional time to respond or offer any explanation for its failure to respond, as provided by section 782(c) of the Act. We note that Eletrosilex's reliance on Borden, De Cecco, Ferro Union, and American Silicon is misplaced. In all those cases, the responding party provided the Department with an explanation for its failure to provide the requested information, and the CIT found that the Department should have determined whether the stated explanation was in fact the reason for the responding party's failure to produce the requested information. Further, it was Eletrosilex's responsibility to provide a "full explanation and suggested alternative forms" of responding to the supplemental questionnaire under section 782(c) of the Act. However, in this case, Eletrosilex has never offered any explanation for its failure to respond to the supplemental questionnaire. In its March 14, 2000 letter requesting an extension of time to file a response to the supplemental questionnaire, Eletrosilex did not claim that it was unable to provide a response to the supplemental questionnaire. Rather, it provided reasons in support of its request for additional time to provide a response. See, Letter from Counsel for Eletrosilex to the Department Requesting Extension for Filing Response to the Department's March 2, 2000 Supplemental Questionnaire, dated March 14, 2000. The Department granted the request for extension, based on those reasons. In addition, after Eletrosilex received the Department's April 12, 2000 letter, in which the Department informed Eletrosilex that it would be forced to use FA, Eletrosilex did not acknowledge the Department's letter or provide any explanation for its failure to respond to the supplemental questionnaire. See, Letter from the Department to Eletrosilex, dated April 12, 2000. Section 782(e) of the Act provides that the Department shall not decline to consider submitted information if several requirements are met, including the requirement that the party submitting the information "has demonstrated that it acted to the best of its ability in providing the information." Eletrosilex has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that it acted to the best of its ability to provide the requested information. After requesting an extension of time to respond to the supplemental questionnaire, and receiving such an extension, Eletrosilex made no further contact with the Department until filing its Case Brief. Eletrosilex did not offer any reason for its failure to respond to the supplemental questionnaire or ask the Department for additional time to respond to the supplemental questionnaire. Additionally, Eletrosilex has failed to demonstrate that there is sufficient information on the record to calculate a margin. In the Preliminary Results, the Department determined that as a result of Eletrosilex's failure to respond to the supplemental questionnaire, "the information Eletrosilex submitted is so incomplete that it cannot serve as a reliable basis for making a preliminary determination." See, Preliminary Results at 47,961 and Application of Facts Available for Eletrosilex S/A ("Eletrosilex"), dated July 27, 2000 ("Application of FA Memo") In this proceeding, Eletrosilex has failed to provide the Department with critical information requested by the Department in the supplemental questionnaire, including: audited financial statements, explanations of affiliation issues, product specifications (regarding silicon content), values for billing adjustment, values for inland freight, reconciliations of direct and indirect selling expense, reconciliation of packing expenses, reconciliation of U.S. imputed credit, detail regarding the costs associated with furnace shut downs, reconciliation of ICMS and IPI taxes, and a reconciliation of total cost of manufacturing figures. See, Application of FA Memo at 3. Without this critical information, the Department cannot calculate an accurate dumping margin. For example, because Eletrosilex did not provide the Department with audited financial statements, as requested in the original and supplemental questionnaires, the Department cannot "substantiate Eletrosilex's information in its questionnaire response." Id. In this regard, we note that Eletrosilex's assertion in its Case Brief that "[i]t is the Department's practice to use unaudited financial statements when respondents did not prepare audited financial statements" is misleading. We note that Eletrosilex does not state that it did not prepare audited financial statements. Rather, Eletrosilex states that it "was not able to provide audited financial statements because they were not available," without explaining why audited financial statements were not available. See, Eletrosilex's Case Brief at 6. In fact, Eletrosilex does prepare audited financial statements in the ordinary course of business and has provided them to the Department in prior administrative reviews. See e.g., Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review: Silicon Metal From Brazil, 63 FR 6899 (February 11, 1998) ("1995- 1996 Silicon Metal"). In addition, Eletrosilex has not submitted bank statements or income statements or income tax returns, as requested in the supplemental questionnaire, or any other financial records that the Department can use to verify the financial information submitted by Eletrosilex in this review. Further, because Eletrosilex failed to include the silicon metal content of the product for multiple home market sales, "the Department is unable to make the appropriate model matching comparisons between HM sales, and U.S. sales in order to calculate a dumping margin." See, Application of FA Memo at 3. Therefore, taken together, the omissions, discussed above, effectively prevented the Department from determining an accurate dumping margin. Thus, by not providing the requested information, Eletrosilex has failed to meet the first, third, and fourth criteria enunciated under section 782(e) of the Act. Also, section 782(c)(1) of the Act is not applicable in this case because Eletrosilex never notified the Department that it would be unable to submit the information requested by the supplemental questionnaire, supplied an explanation for its inability to provide the information or suggested an alternate form of submission. As a result, the Department has resorted to total FA for Eletrosilex in this review. Further, for the reasons set out above, and as stated in the Preliminary Results, 65 FR at 47961-62, and provided in the Application of FA Memo, we determine that Eletrosilex failed to cooperate to the best of its ability and that adverse inferences are warranted. We disagree with Eletrosilex's allegation that the rate that was applied to Eletrosilex in the Preliminary Results is not corroborated as reasonable or relevant. In determining an adverse FA rate for Eletrosilex, the Department notes that calculated margins for Eletrosilex have historically fluctuated between the present rate of 18.87 percent and 51.84 percent. See, 1997-1998 Silicon Metal, and Silicon Metal From Brazil: Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review in Accordance With Court Decision, 65 FR 33297 (May 23, 2000) ("1992-1993 Amended Final"). Eletrosilex received a calculated rate of 18.87 percent for the 1997-1998 POR, a calculated rate of 39.00 percent for the 1995- 1996 POR, a calculated rate of 6.33 percent for the 1994-1995 POR, a calculated rate of 38.39 percent for the 1993-1994 POR, and a calculated rate of 51.84 percent for the 1992-1993 POR. See, 1997-1998 Silicon Metal, 1996-1997 Silicon Metal, 1995-1996 Silicon Metal, Silicon Metal From Brazil; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 62 FR 54087 (October 17, 1997) ("1994-1995 Amended Final Results"), Silicon Metal From Brazil; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 62 FR 54094 (October 17, 1997) and, 1992-1993 Amended Final respectively. It is in the context of substantial fluctuations in its dumping margins that we corroborate the margin assigned to Eletrosilex in light of its failure to cooperate to the best of its ability in this proceeding. In situations involving non-cooperative respondents, the Department has stated in the past that it is its normal practice to select as adverse FA the highest margin from the current or any previous segment of the same proceeding. See, Elemental Sulphur from Canada: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 65 FR 11,980 (March 7, 2000); Brass Sheet and Strip from Germany: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 63 FR 42,823 (Aug. 11, 1998). Therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume that a respondent, knowing the Department's practice in assigning adverse FA, would have provided current information if its current margin was less. Moreover, we note that several respondents in this proceeding similarly have received widely varying calculated margins, ranging from zero to 61.58 percent for CBCC and up to 81.61 percent for RIMA in the 1993-1994 and 1994-1995 PORs, respectively, and, in the original LTFV investigation, CCM and CBCC received calculated margins of 93.20 and 87.79 percent, respectively. See, 1994-1995 Amended Final Results, Silicon Metal from Brazil, Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand (September 23, 1999), and Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Silicon Metal from Brazil, 55 FR 38716 (September 20, 1990). Notably, these widely varying margins generally have not coincided among all companies. In the same periods that margins of 61.58 percent and 81.61 percent were calculated for individual companies, other companies received zero or single digit rates. Eletrosilex, an experienced participant in the antidumping proceedings since the 1991-1992 POR, was on notice as provided by the Department's past practice that if it failed to act to the best of its ability, and the Department applied adverse FA, the rate selected could very well be the highest calculated rate in the proceeding, i.e., the 93.20 percent rate obtained in the LTFV investigation. In determining the FA rate here, the Department considered the fact that, in the 1993-1994 and 1994-1995 PORs, the Department calculated dumping margins of 61.58 percent for CBCC and 81.61 percent for RIMA, respectively, while at the same time, calculating zero or single digit rates for other respondents, demonstrating that in this particular market, some companies may continue to dump at substantial margins while others have eliminated or substantially lowered their margins. The fact that these disparate rates have continued throughout the reviews since the original LTFV investigation, combined with the Eletrosilex's failure to respond to the request for information, supports our conclusion that the 93.20 percent rate from the investigation remains reasonable and relevant. The Department's determination here is in accordance with the Department's policy of selecting the highest calculated rate in the entire proceeding in order to induce future cooperation of a respondent. Comment 4: Calculation of CBCC's Home Market Imputed Credit Expenses CBCC argues that despite having incurred borrowing costs during the POR, the Department, in the preliminary results, declined to use its short-term interest rate to calculate CBCC's imputed credit expense for the home market sales. See, CBCC Brief: Eighth Administrative Review of Silicon Metal from Brazil dated October 2, 2000 ("CBCC Brief"). Instead, the Department used a rate which was provided by CBCC in the course of this review in section B (Home Market Sales) of the questionnaire. That rate was based on the Brazilian TR, a publically available rate which the Department used in a number of prior reviews whenever CBCC had no short- term borrowing in the home market. CBCC argues that despite the fact that (1) its actual short-term loan was first provided to the Department at verification, (2) its duration was limited to a few days, and (3) it was made at a very high interest rate and on an "emergency" basis, the Department should have accepted that loan as representative of the short-term lending activity during the POR in the home market. To do otherwise, CBCC claims, would be contrary to the Department's own methodology and practice. As an example of the Department's determination of the short-term rate in the calculation of the imputed home market credit expenses, CBCC refers to Certain Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars From Turkey; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and New Shipper Review, 64 FR 49,150, 49,155 (September 10, 1999), as well as the CAFC's decision in Aimcor v. United States, 141 F.3d 1098, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Furthermore, CBCC cites to the Department's Antidumping Manual that, according to CBCC, states that in determining the interest rate, the Department is to use the short-term rate actually experienced by the respondent in borrowing funds in local currency during the period under investigation or review. CBCC also cites Policy Bulletin 98.2 as indicating that, if the respondent has short-term borrowing in the relevant market, the Department must use that interest rate in calculating the cost of credit. Only in cases where there is no short-term borrowing can the Department resort to using another rate. Further, according to CBCC, Policy Bulletin 98.2 does not state that the respondent must have a certain number of loans nor that the respondent's actual borrowing experience must comply with additional conditions for the Department to use the respondent's actual short-term interest rate in determining the imputed credit expense. According to CBCC, the duration of a short-term loan has never been a consideration for the Department when calculating a short-term interest rate, so long as the loan met the definition of short-term, which is less than one year. CBCC refers to the Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Certain Cut-To-Length Carbon-Quality Steel Plate Products from Japan, 64 FR 73215, 73230 (December 29, 1999), where the Department included certain overnight loans (lasting 24 hours) in its calculation of the respondent's short-term interest rate. Furthermore, CBCC claims that the characterization as an "emergency" loan is irrelevant because it is an accurate reflection of the company's financial situation and of the market. CBCC claims that like many other Brazilian silicon metal producers, it has refrained from obtaining short-term loans in the home market precisely because the prevailing local market rates are extremely high. The loan at issue, therefore, was considered an "emergency" line of credit because it was not consistent with the company's most effective cash-flow management. For this very reason, the decision was internally criticized in a CBCC internal memorandum. This document states that because of the "exorbitant" cost of the short-term credit contracted by CBCC with its bank, such borrowing "should be used in the future only in case of extreme necessity." See, CBCC Brief, at 7. Despite this internal warning, CBCC maintains that the Department incorrectly construed this document as suggesting that the interest rate charged by CBCC's bank was not in the normal course of trade. Instead, CBCC views this memorandum as management's warning to refrain from using such short-term financing in the future because of its exorbitant cost for the company. Id. CBCC also claims that the interest rate used in the contested loan was not "unusually high" when compared to other published Brazilian short-term commercial rates prevailing at the time. Rather, it is the TR rate, which has been used as a surrogate benchmark for short-term commercial lending in prior cases, that is not at par with other commercial short-term lending rates. CBCC also suggest that the application of the TR rate in the calculation of the imputed credit expenses would be tantamount to the application of FA. Because the information pertaining to the loan is part of the record, the Department cannot disregard it and use an alternative methodology. Consequently, the application of FA is not warranted in this case. Finally, CBCC suggests that should the Department use a different lending rate in the calculation of the imputed credit expenses, the Department should use interest rates published by the IMF which are more comparable to prevailing commercial short-term rates in Brazil during the POR. The petitioners disagree with CBCC. They state that when asked by the Department about short-term borrowing, CBCC in both, the initial and the supplemental questionnaires, clearly stated that it did not have any short- term borrowing in the home market during the POR. See, Silicon Metal from Brazil; 1998-1999 Administrative Review; Rebuttal Brief of the Petitioners ("Petitioners' Rebuttal"), at 2. Instead, the petitioners claim, CBCC referred to the TR rates as the appropriate benchmark to be used in the calculation of the home market imputed expenses. Only at the start of verification, the petitioners state, did CBCC report for the first time, and in direct contradiction to its previous statement, that it did have short-term borrowings in Brazil during the POR in the form of an "emergency" loan from a Brazilian bank with an "aberrational" interest rate. Id. Additionally, the petitioners cite to Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Stainless Steel Round Wire Rod from Korea, 64 FR 17,342, 17,345 (April 9, 1999) ("Round Wire from Korea") where the Department citing Policy Bulletin 98.2, declined to use an overdraft rate in the calculation of imputed credit expenses because the overdraft rate was several times higher than the respondent's regular short-term borrowing rate and thus did not bear any relation to normal commercial borrowing. See, Petitioners' Rebuttal, at 4. According to the petitioners, the Department's practice of excluding an aberrational short-term borrowing rate from credit expense calculations is consistent with its general policy of rejecting aberrational values. The Department's practice is also consistent with its policy for selecting surrogate short-term interest rates that are actually realized by borrowers in the course of "usual commercial behavior," and with the CAFC's determination that surrogate short-term credit costs are to be computed "on the basis of usual and reasonable commercial behavior." See, Petitioners' Rebuttal, at 5. Moreover, the petitioners disagree with CBCC's interpretation of Policy Bulletin 98.2 and the Department's Antidumping Manual. In both cases, the choice of the interest rate is based, among others, on "reasonable commercial behavior." Furthermore, the petitioners claim that since the issuance of Policy Bulletin 98.2, the Department has examined and rejected a borrower's aberrational short-term borrowing rate, for example, in Round Wire from Korea. See, Petitioners' Rebuttal, at 6. Similarly, the petitioners claim that in none of the determinations, cited by CBCC, was the Department faced with deciding whether the proposed rate was aberrational. Id. Furthermore, the petitioners also refer to the fact that the interest rate used by CBCC is not only highly aberrational but also does not reflect the borrowing rates of other Brazilian respondents in the same POR. See, Petitioners' Rebuttal, at 8. With regard to the CBCC's suggestion that the IMF rate is comparable and could be used in lieu of the short-term CBCC rate, the petitioners retort that the IMF rate is not a short-term commercial lending rate. Rather, this rate represents "short-term lending between financial institutions." See, Petitioners' Rebuttal, at 10. Furthermore, because CBCC's emergency loan was first disclosed to the Department at verification, the petitioners claim that they were denied any meaningful opportunity to review and comment on this factual information prior to verification. Therefore, the Department has an additional basis to reject the emergency loan interest rate provided at the start of verification. See, Petitioners' Rebuttal, at 12. In addition, the petitioners claim that contrary to CBCC's assertions, since Policy Bulletin 98.2 was published, the Department has used the TR rate to calculate Brazilian home market credit expenses where a respondent did not have short-term borrowings in the home market currency during the POR. Accordingly, because CBCC twice stated in its questionnaire responses that it has treated the TR rate as an appropriate surrogate lending rate, because the Department has previously found that the TR rate is an appropriate lending rate, and because the record contains no evidence to contradict that finding, the Department properly used the TR rate as a surrogate lending rate to calculate CBCC's imputed credit expenses. See, Petitioners' Rebuttal, at 16. Department's Position: We agree with the petitioners. In the original antidumping questionnaire, when asked about short-term borrowing costs, CBCC stated that it "did not have any short-term borrowings." See, CBCC's Questionnaire Response, at B-20, (Dec. 27, 1999). Instead, CBCC referred the Department to its Exhibit 2, in the same questionnaire, where it provided a set of monthly TR interest rates as well as a monthly average interest rate for the POR of 0.64 percent. On March 27, 2000, when asked to clarify the source for the TR rates, CBCC provided the source documentation for the TR rates and reiterated that it used the TR rates "in the home market credit expense calculation...." See, CBCC's Supplemental Questionnaire, at B-5 and Exhibit 7 (March 27, 2000). As mentioned above, the first time CBCC presented the Department with an example of an actual short-term borrowing was at verification. The documentation of the loan was classified by CBCC as a "minor correction," and, according to the Department's practice, was included in the Department's verification report. Subsequently, when the Department issued its Preliminary Results it stated that: The Department has reviewed the accompanying documentation related to this particular loan. The loan in question lasted for only [several] days, and according to the company's internal memorandum, was made at 'an exorbitant' rate to be used only in 'emergency' situation. The interest rate used in that loan is about [numerous] times higher than the prevailing short-term interest rate being in effect during the POR in Brazil. Consequently, given the fact that there was only one short-term loan made during the course of the POR, a loan with an unusually high interest rate, it is the Department's opinion that the loan does not represent a short-term lending activity in the "normal course of trade." See, Calculation Memorandum of the Preliminary Results for the1998-1999 Administrative Review of CBCC, at 2; (July 31, 2000). CBCC's main objection to the Department's preliminary position is that the above-mentioned loan is not "aberrational" and, therefore, within the normal course of trade. As such, CBCC claims, it should be used in all home market transactions where imputed credit expense has occurred. The Department disagrees with this position. According to CBCC's own documents, presented at verification, the loan was characterized as an "exceptional" loan. Furthermore, the company's internal memorandum, accompanying the loan's documentation, called its interest "exorbitant" and noted that the loan was to be used in "emergency" situations. See, CBCC's Verification Report, Exhibit 14. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines the word "exceptional" as rare and the word "emergency" as an unforseen combination of circumstances (emphasis added). The Policy Bulletin refers to the short- term interest rate as "reasonable" and "representative of usual commercial behavior." See, Policy Bulletin 98.2. Clearly, the loan in question, does not meet any of the Departmental's policy criteria. Further, CBCC is asking the Department to apply the interest rate from this single, several- days long emergency loan, as a benchmark to be used in all home market transactions throughout the 12-month long POR. Such application would generate skewed and unreasonable results, results we believe to be inconsistent with the CAFC opinion in LMI. Such application would not impute credit on the basis of usual and reasonable commercial behavior. See LMI, 912 F.2d at 460-61 (Fed. Cir. 1990). However, the record evidence of CBCC's initial questionnaire (no short-term borrowing; use TR rate for HM credit expense) is consistent with our practice pursuant to the Policy Bulletin 98.2. Consequently, the Department determines that CBCC did not experience borrowing that is "reasonable" and "representative of usual commercial behavior" during the POR. Moreover, according to the Policy Bulletin 98.2, in cases where a respondent has no short-term borrowings in the currency of the transaction, we will use publicly available information to establish a short-term interest rate applicable to the currency of the transaction. See, Policy Bulletin, at 3. Therefore, for these final results, the Department will use the TR rate to calculate CBCC's imputed home market credit costs. This finding is consistent with questionnaire evidence placed on the record by CBCC and Ferrosilicon from Brazil, where the Department stated that "in the absence of actual home short-term borrowings and the lack of substantiated evidence that [the respondent] could have borrowed at the interest rates provided at verification, we have used the TR rate as the interest rate in the calculation of imputed home market credit." Further, in response to CBCC's argument that the Department should use the IMF rates as opposed to the TR rates, we note that in Ferrosilicon from Brazil, the Department agreed with the petitioners' argument that the "IMF rate is not a published commercial interest rate for short-term business loans, but rather a rate at which banks, not companies, can borrow." The Department's use of the TR rates to calculate credit in Ferrosilicon from Brazil and in these final results is further supported by Carbon Steel Plate From Brazil, where the Department determined that the TR rate was a benchmark comparable to a prime rate published by the Bank of Brazil and used the rate to recalculate the respondent's credit costs. Comment 5: COS for CBCC CBCC requests that the Department make a COS adjustment with regard to indirect selling expenses represented by salesmen's salaries. CBCC equates salaries with warranty expenses and claims that a fair comparison of prices entails the recognition that "sellers incur different costs based on differences in selling conditions in their respective markets." See, CBCC's Brief, at 16. To account for these differences, CBCC argues, that section 773(a)(6)(c)(iii) of the Act provides that an adjustment be made for any differences in the circumstances of sale between the export price and the NV. CBCC further claims that, in general, the adjustment includes direct selling expenses, such as commissions, credit expenses, and warranties that result from, and bear a direct relationship to, the particular sale, assumed expenses, and a reasonable allowance for other selling expenses when commissions are paid in one market under consideration but not the other market under consideration. CBCC also argues that the Department's Antidumping Manual notes that "warranties are included even though the expense can not be tied to a particular sale because . . . it is inescapable that had there been no sales, there would have been no warranty expense." Id. On the other hand, CBCC claims, indirect selling expenses, defined as those expenses that do not result from or bear a direct relationship to the sale, are not included as part of the COS adjustment. The Department assumes that such expenses are incurred regardless of whether the sale is made and that the same amounts are generally allocated evenly over all sales regardless of the market. As such, the presumption is that an adjustment is unnecessary because the seller would not incur different costs based on differences in selling conditions. In the Preliminary Results, CBCC states that the Department applied its normal methodology by making a COS adjustment for direct selling expenses, which consisted of imputed credit expense and certain document and mail charges, but did not include other selling expenses that were reported as indirect selling expenses. According to CBCC, the information on the record shows, however, that there are differences in other selling expenses that result from the differences in selling conditions. For example, in the sales office, there is a different number of sales personnel between the export and home market. According to CBCC, had there been no export sales, the company would not have incurred the salaries for the salespersons who are devoted to export sales. Therefore, these expenses should be treated like warranty expenses, which are included as an adjustment even though the expense cannot be tied to a particular sale. Without making an adjustment for this difference, CBCC states, the margin calculation will not be based on ex-factory prices. Consequently, the comparison results in a dumping margin that is largely caused by the difference in selling expenses. Accordingly, the Department should account for this disparity by including the indirect selling expenses as a COS adjustment. See, CBCC Brief, at 18. The petitioners claim that CBCC's argument is without merit. They state that when a respondent waits until its case brief to make a claim for an adjustment, as CBCC did here, the Department should not make the requested adjustment. For example, the petitioners note that in an earlier review in this proceeding, the Department determined that "{b}ecause CBCC did not claim this offset until it submitted its case brief, and because it is a respondent's responsibility to substantiate its claims for offsets, which CBCC has not done, we have not made an offset." Thus, because CBCC waited until its case brief to claim a COS adjustment for indirect selling expenses, its claim should be denied. See, Petitioners' Rebuttal Brief, at 20. The petitioners further argue that, under established Department practice, "it is up to a respondent to substantiate and document any adjustment or claim to the Department." If a respondent fails to provide such substantiation, the Department disregards the claimed adjustment. The Department's practice in this regard is consistent with the principle affirmed by the CIT that the burden of establishing the right to an adjustment lies with the respondent that seeks the adjustment and has access to the necessary information. Here, CBCC has failed to substantiate its requested adjustment for differences in indirect selling expenses. Id. Furthermore, the petitioners argue, such an adjustment would be contrary to law. When home market price is the basis for NV, section 773(a)(6)(c)(iii) of the Act requires that price to be adjusted for differences in the COS. The Department's regulations make clear that "{w}ith the exception of . . . commissions paid in only one market, the {Department} will make circumstances of sale adjustments under Section 773(a)(6)(c)(iii) of the Act only for direct selling expenses and assumed expenses." The regulations define direct selling expenses as "expenses, such as commissions, credit expenses, guarantees, and warranties, that result from and bear a direct relationship to, the particular sale in question. Consistent with this provision, the Department does not grant COS adjustments for differences in indirect selling expenses. Notwithstanding the clarity of the Department's regulations and practice, CBCC asks for a COS adjustment for indirect selling expenses. Specifically, without citing any support in the record, CBCC claims that there are differences in its home market and U.S. indirect selling expenses resulting from differences in selling conditions, as illustrated by different numbers of sales people for the export and home markets. CBCC claims that its indirect selling expenses should be treated like warranty expenses because "{h}ad there been no export sales, CBCC would not have incurred the salaries for the salespersons who are devoted to export sales." The petitioners argue that the Department's definition of "direct selling expenses" explicitly includes warranty expenses. By definition, it does not include indirect selling expenses. Moreover, according to the petitioners, indirect selling expenses, including salespeople's salaries, are expenses that do not result from or bear a direct relationship to a sale. Salaries and other indirect selling expenses are incurred regardless of whether there is any sale. Indeed, CBCC's export salespeople indiscriminately work on export sales for products other than silicon metal and to countries other than the United States. Similarly, CBCC's home market salespeople work on sales of products other than silicon metal. They are salaried employees, and thus their salaries are expenses that do not result from or bear a direct relationship to any home market or U.S. sale of silicon metal. Accordingly, salaries and the other indirect selling expenses are not at all like warranty expenses. Consistent with these facts, the Department has consistently treated expenses for a sales office and salesmen's salaries as indirect selling expenses that do not qualify for a COS adjustment. For all of these reasons, the petitioners ask the Department not make a COS adjustment for differences in CBCC's indirect selling expenses in the final results. Department's Position: We agree with the petitioners. The Department's regulations state that the COS adjustment will be made only for "direct selling expenses." Further, the regulations define direct selling expenses as "commissions, credit expenses, guarantees, and warranties that result from, and bear a direct relationship to, the particular sales in question." See, 19 CFR 351.410(b) and (c). CBCC's claim that its sales staff salaries are comparable to warranty expenses does not have any basis in evidence on the record and is presented, for the first time, in its case brief. We note that it is a respondent's responsibility to substantiate its claims in a timely fashion, which CBCC has not done here. See, Silicon Metal From Brazil; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and Determination Not To Revoke in Part, 62 FR 1988 (January 14, 1997) ("1994-1995 Silicon Metal"). Not only did CBCC present its claim for the first time in its case brief, it has also not provided any documentation to support the merit of its claim. In the instant case, salaries of the sales staff are incurred regardless of whether there is any sale. In fact, salespeople can and do work on subject and non-subject merchandise as well as exports to markets other than the United States. Therefore, salaries do not bear a direct relationship to any home or U.S. sale of silicon metal and, as such, cannot be classified as direct selling expenses and do not warrant the same treatment as warranty expenses. See, Color Picture Tubes From Japan; Final Results of Antidumping Administrative Review, 62 FR, 34201 (June 25, 1997); Notice of Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review: Certain Pasta From Italy, 65 FR 7352 (February 14, 2000); Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Certain Residential Door Locks and Parts Thereof From Taiwan, 54 FR 53,153, 53,160 (December 27, 1989); Certain Tapered Journal Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof From Italy; Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 49 FR 2,278, 2,279 (January 19, 1984). For reasons stated above, the Department did not make the COS adjustment in these final results. Comment 6: CBCC's Financial Expense Ratio The petitioners claim that in the Preliminary Results, the Department erred when it utilized the financial statements of CBCC's Belgian parent company in order to calculate CBCC's financial expense ratio, even though CBCC was the company that produced, sold and exported silicon metal. Because the Belgian parent company consists of many subsidiaries and affiliated companies, the petitioners argued, the extent to which the actual costs incurred by CBCC to produce and sell silicon metal are reflected on the parent company's financial statements are small and, thus, not represented by the parent company's financial statements. See, Petitioners' Case Brief, at 18. The petitioners believe that CBCC's financial statements show a higher actual ratio of financial expenses than the one utilized by the Department from the consolidated financial statements of CBCC's Belgian parent. In addition, the petitioners cite to a recent CIT decision where the Court ruled that the Department's use of consolidated financial statements was not supported by substantial evidence. See, Petitioners' Case Brief, at 19. Should the Department reject the petitioners' request, and base the ratio of the financial expenses on the consolidated financial statements, then it should disallow any offsets to CBCC's financial expenses as these offsets were not substantiated in CBCC's record. See, Petitioners' Case Brief, at 24. CBCC argues that the petitioners' claim is without merit and should be rejected. According to CBCC, the petitioners' reliance on AIMCOR v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 1345, 1353 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1999) ("AIMCOR") and American Silicon Technologies v. United States, Ct. No. 97-02-00267, 1999 WL 354415 (Ct. Int'l Trade April 9, 1999), is mistaken because these cases dealt with another POR where the Court found that there was not enough evidence on the record to establish that Solvay & Cie exercised direct control over CBCC. See, CBCC's Rebuttal Brief, at 14. CBCC claims that the instant review provides ample evidence that the parent company was involved in CBCC's financial activity, such as inter-company transactions and borrowing, thus exercising sufficient control over CBCC in order to rely on the consolidated financial statements when calculating financial expense. Department's Position: We agree with CBCC. Our established policy is to calculate financial expenses for COP and CV purposes based on the borrowing costs incurred at the consolidated group level, regardless of whether the respondent's financial expense is greater than the consolidated financial expense. This practice recognizes two facts: (1) The fungible nature of money within a consolidated group of companies; and (2) that the controlling entity within a consolidated group has the power to determine the capital structure (i.e., the debt and equity) of each member company within its group. See, 1995-1996 Silicon Metal; Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Steel Wire Rod from Canada, 63 FR 182 (February 24, 1998). Contrary to the petitioner's arguments, the situation in this case differs from that in AIMCOR. In AIMCOR, the CIT stated that "Commerce is justified in utilizing consolidated financial statements when corporate control, whether direct or indirect, exists. . ." See, AIMCOR, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 1354. However, in that case the CIT found that "there was no evidence of inter-company borrowing or other indicia" that the respondent's parent company determined the respondent's cost of money. Id. Based on that fact, the CIT instructed the Department to recalculate the respondent's financial expenses using the financial statements of the respondent. Id. In the instant proceeding, Solvay & Cie of Belgium was the majority owner of CBCC during the POR. At verification, the Department reviewed CBCC's corporate structure and determined that CBCC is under direct control of Solvay & Cie. See, Verification of Sales and Cost Responses of Companhia Brasileira Carbureto de Calcio (CBCC) for the 1998-1999 Antidumping Duty Administrative Review of Silicon Metal from Brazil ("CBCC's Verification Report"), July 24, 2000; at 3. The report further states that "the [parent] company participated in the inter-company loans to minimize the risk to the parent company" and, additionally, it provided CBCC with auditing services. See, CBCC's Verification Report, at 3, 20, and Exhibit 42. Thus, in the instant review, contrary to the circumstances in the AIMCOR case, there is record evidence of corporate control by Solvay & Cie and its influence on CBCC's cost of money. Additionally, the Department faced the same factual situation with regard to CBCC in the prior 1995- 1996 administrative review wherein it also based the financial expense calculation on the consolidated financial statement of the parent company. See, 1995-1996 Silicon Metal. Moreover, in the preceding segment of the review, where inter-company loans took place between a respondent and its parent company, the financial expense calculation was also based on the consolidated financial statements of both companies. See, 1997-1998 Silicon Metal. Consequently, for these final results, we continued to base CBCC's financial expense on the consolidated financial statements. Comment 7: CBCC's Consolidated Financial Statement The petitioners argue that because the POR straddles two accounting period, i.e., 1998 and 1999, the Department should have calculated the financial expense ratio based on both periods. For the preliminary results, the Department based its financial expense ratio on the 1998 consolidated financial statements. The petitioners claim that using only one accounting period distorts the resulting financial expense ratio. See, Petitioners' Brief, at 20. In response, CBCC claims that the Department was correct in applying a single whole year rather than trying to combine two different accounting periods when calculating a financial expense ratio. According to CBCC, such combination of two periods would be distortive because "the costs from a six-month period cannot be properly compared to a full year's data." See, CBCC's Rebuttal Brief, at 17. Moreover, CBCC claims that the Department used the same methodology with regard to CBCC in the prior segment of the proceeding. Id. CBCC asks the Department to continue to use the same methodology of a single accounting year for these final results of the review. Department's Position: We agree with CBCC. The Department normally bases the financial expense ratio on the respondent's audited financial statements for the full-year period that most closely corresponds to the POR (see the Department's questionnaire at D-17). See, Final Results of Administrative Review: Stainless Steel Bar from India, 65 FR 48965 (August 10, 2000), Decision Memorandum, Comment 9. As stated above, the Department based CBCC's financial expenses on the audited and consolidated 1998 financial statement of its parent company. Additionally, the Department notes that 1998 was the only year for which the consolidated statements were available. The approach is consistent with 1997-1998 Silicon Metal, where the Department, facing a similar situation, based its financial expense calculation on the 1997 consolidated financial statement. Furthermore, the Department verified CBCC's financial expenses and is satisfied as to the veracity of the financial information submitted by the respondent. Accordingly, following our practice, in the instant review, we have used financial expenses based on the CBCC's 1998 consolidated and audited financial statement. Comment 8: CBCC's Short-Term Income Offset The petitioners contend that the Department should not allow CBCC to reduce total financial expenses by "income from current assets" because CBCC failed to substantiate and document that this category of income qualifies as an offset to financial expenses under the Department's established practice. The petitioners maintain that the Department only allows respondents to reduce financial expense by interest income derived from short-term investments of working capital. According to the petitioners, CBCC has the burden of establishing its right to reduce financial expense by such interest income. However, in the instant review, the petitioners claim that CBCC never demonstrated that "income from current assets" constituted interest income, nor did it demonstrate that the interest income was derived from short-term investments of working capital. CBCC claims that it correctly reduced total financial expenses by income from current assets because by definition current assets are short- term in nature and, thus, the income generated from these assets is short- term in nature. Department's Position: We agree with the petitioners. In calculating COP and CV, it is the Department's practice to allow a respondent to offset (i.e., reduce) financial expenses with short-term interest income earned from the general operations of the company. See, Timken v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1040, 1048 (CIT 1994) ("Timken"). In calculating a company's cost of financing, we recognize that, in order to maintain its operations and business activities, a company must maintain a working capital reserve to meet its daily cash requirements (e.g., payroll, suppliers, etc.). The Department further recognizes that companies normally maintain this working capital reserve in interest-bearing accounts. The Department, therefore, allows a company to offset its financial expense with the short- term interest income earned on these working capital accounts. The Department does not, however, allow a company to offset its financial expense with income earned from investing activities (e.g., long-term interest income, capital gains, dividend income) because such activities are not related to the current operations of the company. See, Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From The Federal Republic of Germany; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 56 FR 31734 (July 11, 1991). We note that the CIT has upheld the Department's approach to calculating the financial expense offset with only short-term interest income. See, Gulf States Tube Division of Quanex Corp. v. United States, 981 F. Supp. 630 (CIT 1997) and NTN Bearing Corp. v. United States, 905 F. Supp.1083, 1097 (CIT 1995) (citing Timken at 1048), in which the CIT held that, to qualify for an offset, interest income must be related to the "ordinary operations of the company". Furthermore, we note that the burden of proof to substantiate and document this adjustment is on the respondent making a claim for an offset. See, Timken Company v. United States, 673 F. Supp. 495, 513 (CIT 1987); and Gray Portland Cement and Clinker from Japan; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review 60 FR 43761, 43767 (August 23, 1995). In the instant review, the Department requested that CBCC list "all interest income and expense items and other financing amounts used to compute net interest expense." See, the Department's Antidumping Questionnaire dated October 19, 1999, at page D-12. In response to the Department's request, CBCC provided a worksheet wherein it calculated net interest expense by reducing total consolidated financial expenses by total consolidated financial income from current assets. However, CBCC never listed all of the income items that were included in the total consolidated financial income from current assets and, thus, we are unable to determine whether the total claimed income offset includes only interest income that is short-term in nature. Moreover, the types of current assets held by the consolidated entity do not clearly demonstrate that the assets generated only interest income (e.g., the consolidated entity listed among its current assets, "Short-term cash investments-- Other investments"). On March 27, 2000, the Department issued a supplemental questionnaire wherein it again requested from CBCC supporting documentation regarding the nature of the financial income offset. CBCC responded by stating that it does not have access to such information. See, the Department's Antidumping Supplemental Questionnaire Response dated March 27, 2000, at page D-6. Therefore, by simply offsetting financial expense by the total financial income from current assets, CBCC failed to demonstrate that the "income from current assets" constituted short-term interest income. See, 1996-1997 Silicon Metal. Additionally, at verification, CBCC was not able to substantiate that financial income was derived from short-term investments. See, Verification Report, at 21. Accordingly, for the final results we disallowed the claimed offset to financial expense. Comment 9: Allocation of CBCC's Indirect Labor Costs The petitioners allege that CBCC's COP is understated because of CBCC's allocation of total indirect labor costs to all of its furnaces, including idle furnaces. According to the petitioners, the Department has already rejected, in a preceding segment of this proceeding, CBCC's allocation of labor costs to idle furnaces. Consistent with that determination, in this review, CBCC allocated its monthly total direct labor costs to silicon metal based on the ratio of silicon metal production to total production. For the final results, the Department should use the same monthly allocation ratios used by CBCC to allocate total direct labor costs to allocate monthly total indirect labor costs to silicon metal. CBCC states that indirect labor costs were allocated to administrative expenses because these expenses are incurred even when the furnaces are idle. CBCC objects to the allocation of the indirect labor expenses according to silicon metal production ratios because, it believes, such expenses are not directly related to the production of the subject merchandise. Department's Position: We agree with CBCC. In the instant review, CBCC allocated indirect labor expenses related to active furnaces as part of the fixed overhead. Indirect labor allocated to the idle furnaces is captured in CBCC's G&A expenses. This practice reflects our position in a prior segment of this proceeding where we stated that "it is more appropriate to allocate these costs [labor costs] to all products produced by CBCC since, during idle time, the labor costs incurred are not directly related to any specific product." See, 1994-1995 Silicon Metal from Brazil (emphasis added). By allocating part of the indirect labor expenses, related to idled furnaces, to G&A expenses, CBCC conformed to our practice of treating such expenses as not directly related to the production of subject merchandise. Consequently, for these final results, we have not changed the allocation of the indirect labor expenses. Determination Not To Revoke CBCC After review of the record, the Department determines that although CBCC has had zero or de minimis dumping margins for the previous two review periods, during the current review CBCC's weight- averaged dumping margin is determined to be 0.63 percent, above the de minimis rate. A rate must be below 0.50 percent to be de minimis. See, 19 CFR 351.106(c). Consequently, CBCC has not made sales of subject merchandise "at not less than NV for a period of at least three consecutive years" as required by the Department's regulations. Because one of the requirements to qualify for revocation has not been met, the Department has not addressed the issues of commercial quantities and whether the continued application of the antidumping duty order is necessary to offset dumping with regard to CBCC. As a result of our analysis of factual information submitted to us during the course of this review, we determine not to revoke this order with respect to CBCC. Determination Not To Revoke LIASA After review of the criteria outlined at sections 351.222(b) and 351.222(d) of the Department's regulations, the Department's practice, the comments of the parties, and the evidence on the record, we have determined that the requirements for revocation have not been met. As discussed above, we have determined with respect to subject merchandise produced and also exported by LIASA that its sales were not made in commercial quantities in accordance with 19 CFR 351.222(e). Because one of the requirements to qualify for revocation has not been met, the Department has not addressed whether the continued application of the antidumping duty order is necessary to offset dumping with regard to LIASA. As a result of our analysis of factual information submitted to us during the course of this review, we determine not to revoke this order with respect to LIASA. Recommendation Based on our analysis of the comments received, we recommend adopting all of the above positions and adjusting all related margin calculations accordingly. If these recommendations are accepted, we will publish the final results of review and the final weighted-average dumping margins for all reviewed firms in the Federal Register. AGREE__________ DISAGREE__________ ____________________________ Bernard T. Carreau, fulfilling the duties of Assistant Secretary for Import Administration ____________________________ (Date)