65 FR 18286, April 7, 2000 A-122-822 Sunset Review Public Document MEMORANDUM TO: Robert S. LaRussa Assistant Secretary for Import Administration FROM: Jeffrey A. May Director Office of Policy SUBJECT: Issues and Decision Memo for the Full Sunset Review of the Antidumping Duty Order on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Canada; Preliminary Results Summary: We have analyzed the substantive responses and rebuttals of interested parties in the full sunset review of the antidumping duty order on corrosion-resistant carbon steel flat products from Canada. We recommend that you approve the positions we have developed in the Discussion of the Issues section of this memorandum for these preliminary results of review. Below is the complete list of the issues in this full sunset review for which we received comments by parties: 1. Adequacy of Respondent Interested Party Response 2. Likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping Weighted-average dumping margin Volume of imports 3. Magnitude of the margin likely to prevail Margins from the investigation Use of a more recent margin Duty Absorption History of the Order: On August 19, 1993, the Department published an antidumping duty order on corrosion-resistant carbon steel flat products from Canada.(1) On September 26, 1995, following an appeal and remand, the final determination was amended and the Department assigned a weighted-average antidumping duty margin of 11.71 percent for Dofasco, Inc. ("Dofasco"), 22.70 percent for Stelco, Inc. ("Stelco"), and 18.71 percent for "all others.(2) The Department has completed five administrative reviews of the order. In the first administrative review, covering the period February 4, 1993, through July 31, 1994, the Department assigned a margin of 1.65 percent for Dofasco, 0.19 percent for Stelco, and 1.96 percent for Continuous Color Corporation ("CCC").(3) In the second administrative review, covering the period August 1, 1994, through July 31, 1995, the Department, in an amended final determination, assigned a margin of 0.59 percent for Dofasco, 1.31 percent for CCC, and 0.55 percent for Stelco.(4) In the third administrative review, covering the period August 1, 1995, through July 31, 1996, the Department assigned amended margins of 0.72 percent for Dofasco, 0.54 percent for CCC, and 1.55 percent for Stelco.(5) In the fourth administrative review, covering the period August 1, 1996, through July 31, 1997, the Department determined margins of 2.26 for CCC and 2.73 percent for Stelco,(6) and amended Dofasco's margin to 1.00 percent.(7) In the fifth administrative review, covering the period August 1, 1997, through July 31, 1998, the Department determined margins of 1.01 percent for CCC, 0.16 percent for Dofasco, 5.65 percent for National Steel Company ("National"), and 0.68 percent for Stelco.(8) The Department has made two duty absorption findings with respect to the order. In the 1995/96 review, the Department found that Dofasco, Stelco, and CCC absorbed antidumping duties on 16.05 percent, 16.50 percent and 2.72 percent, respectively, of their U.S, sales.(9) In the most recent review, covering the 1997/98 period, the Department found antidumping duty absorption of antidumping duties on 22.63 percent for Stelco's and 20.38 percent CCC's U.S. sales.(10) There have been no scope rulings or circumvention determinations in this proceeding. Background: On September 1, 1999, the Department initiated a sunset review of the antidumping duty order on cut-to-length carbon steel plate from Canada,(11) pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended ("the Act"). The Department received a notice of intent to participate on behalf of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation and U.S. Steel Corporation, a unit of USX Corporation, Ispat Inland, Inc., and LTV Steel Company, Inc. (collectively, "domestic interested parties"), within the applicable deadline (September 15, 1999) specified in section 351.218(d)(1)(i) of the Sunset Regulations. On September 24, 1999, we received a request for an extension to file rebuttal comments from domestic interested parties.(12) Pursuant to 19 CFR 351.302(b), the Department extended the deadline for all participants eligible to file rebuttal comments until October 15, 1999.(13) On October 1, 1999, we received a complete substantive response from domestic interested parties, within the 30-day deadline specified in the Sunset Regulations under section 351.218(d)(3)(i). On October 1, 1999, Dofasco and Sorevco, Inc. ("Sorevco") in separate submissions, expressed to the Department their intent to participate in this review as a respondent interested party. Domestic interested parties claimed interested-party status under section 771(9)(C) of the Act, as U.S. producers of a domestic like product; Dofasco and Sorevco are interested parties pursuant to section 771(9)(A) of the Act, as foreign producers and exporters of subject merchandise. All interested parties claim that they have been involved in this proceeding since its inception. Domestic interested parties state that they have participated in the investigation, all five administrative reviews, and all related appeals (see October 1, 1999, Substantive Response of domestic interested parties at 4). Likewise, Dofasco and Sorevco state that they participated as respondent parties in the original investigation, and have participated in each subsequent administrative review (see October 1, 1999, Substantive Responses of Dofasco at 3 and Sorevco at 2). Sorevco notes that, in the original investigation, the Department "collapsed" Sorevco with Dofasco Inc., another Canadian producer with a fifty percent ownership interest in Sorevco (see October 1, 1999, Substantive Response of Sorevco at 2). Further the Department has continued to "collapse" the two companies in each administrative review, and in the Department's notices, "Dofasco" incorporates both Dofasco and Sorevco. Id. However, the companies are represented by separate legal counsel. Id. On October 15, 1999, we received rebuttal comments from domestic interested parties and Dofasco. On October 20, 1999, pursuant to 19 CFR 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(A), the Department determined to an expedited (120-day) sunset review of this order.(14) On December 9, 1999, we received comments from Dofasco on adequacy and the appropriateness of the Department's decision to conduct an expedited sunset review with respect to the subject order. As discussed below, the Department has now determined to conduct a full review. In accordance with section 751(c)(5)(C)(v) of the Act, the Department may treat a review as extraordinarily complicated if it is a review of a transition order (i.e., an order in effect on January 1, 1995). This review concerns a transition order within the meaning of section 751(c)(6)(ii) of the Act. Accordingly, on December 22, 1999, the Department determined that the sunset review of corrosion- resistant carbon steel flat products from Canada is extraordinarily complicated, and extended the time limit for completion of the final results of this review until not later than March 29, 2000, in accordance with section 751(c)(5)(B) of the Act.(15) Discussion of the Issues In accordance with section 751(c)(1) of the Act, the Department is conducting this review to determine whether revocation of the antidumping duty order would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c) of the Act provides that, in making this determination, the Department shall consider the weighted- average dumping margins determined in the investigation and subsequent reviews, and the volume of imports of the subject merchandise for the period before and the period after the issuance of the antidumping order. In addition, section 752(c)(3) of the Act provides that the Department shall provide to the Commission the magnitude of the margin of dumping likely to prevail if the order is revoked. Below we address the comments and rebuttals of the interested parties. 1. Comments on Adequacy Interested Party Comments Dofasco asserts that the Department erred by failing to take into account that National Steel is both a domestic producer and a Canadian producer of subject merchandise from Canada. Dofasco contends that National Steel is the largest exporter of subject merchandise from Canada and notes that one Canadian respondent in the corresponding Commission sunset review estimates that National Steel accounts for more than fifty percent of imports from Canada (see December 9, 1999, Comments on Adequacy of Dofasco at 3). Further, Dofasco notes that the Department's regulations specifically contemplate that the Department will ignore certain data when a domestic producer is affiliated with a foreign producer and the Department has the discretion to determine that respondents' response are adequate even if these respondents do not account for fifty percent of exports. According to Dofasco, given National Steel's role as both a respondent and a domestic producer, the Department cannot properly consider National Steel's exports in its adequacy determination. Id. Dofasco believes that if National's exports are properly excluded, exports of Dofasco would warrant a full review according to the Department's criteria. Id. Dofasco emphasizes that domestic interested parties did not argue that Canadian respondents' responses were inadequate. Therefore, Dofasco requests that the Department reverse its decision and find that Canadian respondents' responses were adequate for the purpose conduct of conducting a full sunset review. Id. at 4. Department's Position The Department agrees with respondent interested parties that a full review is appropriate in this case. While section 351.218(e)(1)(i)(B) provides that we may disregard a response from a domestic interested party that is related to a foreign producer or exporter for purposes of determining adequacy of responses for domestic interested parties, we agree that it is appropriate to consider Dofasco's assertion that National Steel, although subject to the order with respect to its imports from Canada, is also a domestic producer. Taking into account that National Steel may account for around 50 percent of the imports from Canada, our reexamination of the percent of imports accounted for by respondent interested parties shows that respondent interested parties account for a significant percent of imports. As a result, although respondent interested parties' imports account for less than the 50 percent threshold normally applied by the Department for determining the adequacy of responses from respondent interested parties, we determine that it is appropriate to conduct a full review in this case. 2. Likelihood of Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping Interested Party Comments In their substantive response of October 1, 1999, domestic interested parties assert that revocation of the subject order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping. They state that the record of this proceeding demonstrates that, since the imposition of the antidumping duty order, Canadian producers have continued to sell subject merchandise at less-than-fair value, and that shipments of subject merchandise have decreased significantly (see October 1, 1999, Substantive Response of domestic interested parties at 5). Domestic interested parties note that, in each of the five administrative reviews, the Department found that at least two, and sometimes three, respondents had engaged in dumping at above de minimis levels. Thus, the record shows that dumping has continued at above de minimis levels after the imposition of the order and, on that basis alone, this case satisfies the Department's guidelines and the order should not be revoked. Id. at 10. Further, domestic interested parties contend that, after the issuance of the antidumping duty order, Canadian annual shipments of corrosion-resistant steel ranged from 27.3 percent to 44.9 percent below their pre-order levels, and Canadian producers' share of U.S. domestic consumption of corrosion-resistant steel shows an even greater decline. Id. at 10-11. This significant decline would warrant the continuation of the order even if Canada's producers had stopped dumping. Id. at 12. In its October 1, 1999, substantive response Dofasco asserts that revocation of the order will not lead to a continuation or recurrence of dumping. Dofasco notes that it has been assigned by the Department consistently low margins since the investigation, with its highest margin of any administrative review at 1.72 percent (see October 1, 1999, Substantive Response of Defasco at 4). According to Dofasco, it has achieved margins below the two percent de minimis threshold in every administrative review since the original investigation, and margins at or below one percent since the first administrative review, while significantly increasing its U.S. sales. Id. at 5. Therefore, Dofasco contends, if the antidumping duty order were to be revoked, all available evidence indicates that dumping by Dofasco would be non-existent or commercially negligible. Id. In its October 1, 1999, substantive response, Sorevco incorporates by reference the statement of Dofasco, submitted October 1, 1999, with respect to likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping (see October 1, 1999, Substantive Response of Sorevco at 2). In their rebuttal of October 15, 1999, domestic interested parties assert that, contrary to the claims of Dofasco and Sorevco ("respondent interested parties"), continuation of the antidumping duty order is necessary to prevent the continuation or recurrence of dumping (see October 15, 1999, Rebuttal of domestic interested parties at 2). Domestic interested parties contend that each Canadian respondent has continued to sell subject merchandise in the United States at less-than-fair value ("LTFV") and import volumes fell significantly following the 1993 imposition of the order, showing that dumping is likely to continue. Id. at 2-3. In addition, domestic interested parties assert that, contrary to respondent interested parties' argument, the Department's analysis of declining or no margins and steady or increasing imports does not focus on the experience of an individual respondent, but concerns all producers subject to the order. Id. at 4. Thus, to determine whether a continuation or resumption of dumping is likely, the Department must analyze the record with respect to all respondents. Id. Further, domestic interested parties contend that respondent interested parties have consistently had margins above de minimis [i.e., 0.5 percent] in every completed administrative review and the Department's definition of de minimis is controlling. Id. at 6. Regardless of the fact that respondent interested parties' margins may have decreased or remained steady over time, domestic interested parties assert that the fact that there were margins above de minimis for Canadian producers/exporters provides conclusive evidence that, without the order, dumping is likely to recur. Id. at 7. Finally, domestic interested parties contend that, although respondent interested parties claim that their imports have increased since the imposition of the order, the Department's analysis should be order-wide, not focused on just one producer. Id. According to domestic interested parties, current Canadian exports of subject merchandise to the United States have decreased 34 percent from total exports in 1992/93, the period prior to the order. Id. In its rebuttal of October 15, 1999, Dofasco reasserts its position that there is no likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping if the order on subject merchandise were revoked (see October 15, 1999, Rebuttal of Dofasco at 2). Dofasco contends that the actual dumping margins calculated for Dofasco since the original investigation demonstrate consistently low margins. Id. Dofasco notes that the highest margin in any administrative review for Dofasco was 1.72 percent, which would be considered de minimis in an original investigation under the URAA. Dofasco adds that the fact that it has consistently achieved margins at or below one percent since the first administrative review, combined with its significant increase in U.S. sales, leads to the conclusion that it need not dump to maintain market share in the United States. Id. Department's Position Drawing on the guidance provided in the legislative history accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act ("URAA"), specifically the Statement of Administrative Action ("the SAA"), H.R. Doc. No. 103- 316, vol. 1 (1994), the House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt.1 (1994), and the Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 103-412 (1994), the Department issued its Sunset Policy Bulletin providing guidance on methodological and analytical issues, including the bases for likelihood determinations. In its Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department indicated that determinations of likelihood will be made on an order-wide basis (see section II.A.2). In addition, the Department indicated that, normally, it will determine that revocation of an antidumping order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping where (a) dumping continued at any level above de minimis after the issuance of the order, (b) imports of the subject merchandise ceased after the issuance of the order, or (c) dumping was eliminated after the issuance of the order and import volumes for the subject merchandise declined significantly (see section II.A.3). As discussed in section II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the SAA at 890, and the House Report at 63-64, if companies continue dumping with the discipline of an order in place, the Department may reasonably infer that dumping would continue if the discipline were removed. Domestic interested parties are correct that there have been above de minimis margins in each of the five administrative reviews. Dofasco is also correct that its margins have been consistently low since the investigation, with its highest margin of any administrative review at 1.71 percent in the first review of 1993/94. Nonetheless, margins have continued to exist at above de minimis levels. Consistent with section 752(c) of the Act, the Department also considered the volume of imports before and after issuance of the order. The import statistics provided by domestic interested parties with respect to imports of subject merchandise from 1991 to 1997, and those examined by the Department (U.S. Census Bureau IM146 reports) demonstrate that imports of the subject merchandise from Canada declined following the order in 1993. Further, according to interested parties and IM146 statistics, imports began to increase in 1996, and have continued to increase steadily through 1998. Based on this analysis, the Department finds that the existence of dumping margins after the issuance of the order is highly probative of the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping. Deposit rates above a de minimis level continue in effect for at least one Canadian producer/exporter of subject merchandise in every administrative review since the order. Therefore, given that dumping continued after the issuance of the order, we determine that dumping is likely to continue if the order were revoked. 3. Magnitude of the Margin Likely to Prevail: Interested Party Comments: In their substantive response, domestic interested parties assert that the Department should report to the Commission the margins from the original investigation of 11.71 percent for Dofasco, 22.70 percent for Stelco, and 18.71 percent for "all other" producers including CCC because these are the only calculated rates that reflect the behavior of the exporters without the discipline of the order in place (see October 1, 1999, substantive response of domestic interested parties at 13). In addition, domestic interested parties note that the Department determined in the 1995/96 review that Dofasco, Stelco, and CCC absorbed antidumping duties on 16.05 percent, 16.50 percent, and 2.72 percent, respectively of their U.S, sales. Further, in the most recent review covering the 1997/98 period, the Department determined duty absorption of 22.63 percent for Stelco and 20.38 percent for CCC. Accordingly, domestic interested parties assert, the Department should adjust the current margins to reflect its duty absorption findings. Id. at 15. In its substantive response, Dofasco contends that, if the Department finds a likelihood of continued dumping, it nevertheless should select a rate from one of the administrative review periods rather than the dumping margins in the original investigation (see October 1, 1999, Substantive Response of Dofasco at 5). Dofasco asserts that its dumping margins have declined and its import volumes have remained steady or increased since the Department's original determination. Id. Specifically, Dofasco claims that it has exported more corrosion-resistant carbon steel flat products to the United states in each year since the antidumping duty order, than in the year before the Department initiated its original investigation. Id. at 6. Finally, Dofasco adds that, although there may be some question as to which of the particular administrative review rates that the Department chooses, clearly, Dofasco has demonstrated that it has been able to decrease its dumping margin while increasing imports in the years since the original investigation. Id. In its substantive response, Sorevco incorporates by reference the statement of Dofasco, submitted October 1, 1999, with respect to the magnitude of the margin (see October 1, 1999, Substantive Response of Sorevco at 2). In their rebuttal, domestic interested parties assert that the Department should not, as respondent interested parties claim, report to the Commission a more recently calculated margin. Rather, in analyzing whether import volumes remained steady or increased, the Department normally will consider the company's relative market share, which, in this case, indicates that respondent interested parties do not justify reporting a more recent margin. Id. at 9. Domestic interested parties reassert that the Department should report to the Commission 11.71 percent, the margin from the investigation for Dofasco. In its rebuttal, Dofasco asserts that, contrary to the arguments of domestic interested parties, the Department should select a rate from one of the administrative review period rather than the dumping margin in the original investigation (see October 15, 1999, Rebuttal of Dofasco at 4). Dofasco contends that because its import volumes have remained steady or increased since the period prior to the Department's original determination, the margin from the original investigation is an irrelevant indicator of the margin that is likely to prevail if the order is revoked. Finally, Dofasco reasserts that, although there may be some question as to which of the particular administrative review rates that the Department should choose, there is no question that Dofasco has been able to decrease its dumping margin while increasing exports since the original investigation. Id. Therefore, the Department should choose a rate from one of the administrative reviews to report to the Commission for Dofasco. Id. Department's Position In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department stated that it will normally provide to the Commission the margin that was determined in the final determination in the original investigation. Further, for companies not specifically investigated or for companies that did not begin shipping until after the order was issued, the Department normally will provide a margin based on the "all others" rate from the investigation (see section II.B.1 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin). Exceptions to this policy include the use of a more recently calculated margin, where appropriate, and consideration of duty absorption determinations (see sections II.B.2 and 3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin). The SAA at 890-91, and the House Report at 64, state that if dumping margins have declined over the life of the order and imports have remained steady or increased, the Department may conclude that exporters are likely to continue dumping at the lower rates found in a more recent review. Section II.B.2 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin provides that in analyzing whether imports volumes remained steady or increase, the Department normally will consider the company's relative market share. We agree with respondents that in all the administrative reviews subsequent to the order, the Department assigned margins below those of the original investigation to respondent interested parties. Further, according to statistics from interested parties and those examined by the Department from the IM146 reports, imports decreased immediately after the issuance of the order. Although total imports from Canada fell below the high volumes reported in 1993 (the year the order was impose), they remained above the pre-1993 volumes. The domestic interested parties assert that Canadian producers' share of the U.S. market declined after the issuance of the order. As such, it is not appropriate to rely on a more recent rate. Further, relying on proprietary data submitted by respondent interested parties, domestic interested parties assert that respondent interested parties' market share since the imposition of the order does not support the use of a more recently calculated margin. We agree with domestic interested parties. Consistent with our stated policy, we determine that the evidence on the record does not support the use of a more recently calculated rate. Therefore, but for our consideration of duty absorption, we preliminarily determine that the rates from the original investigation are probative of the behavior of exporters without the discipline of the order. The SAA at 885, and the House Report at 60 provide that duty absorption is a strong indicator that the current dumping margins calculated by the Department in the reviews may not be indicative of the margins that would exist in the absence of an order. Once an order is revoked, the importer could achieve the same pre-revocation return on its sales by lowering its prices in the United States in the amount of the duty that previously was being absorbed. Therefore, in the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department indicated that it would normally determine that a company's current dumping margin is not indicative of the margin likely to prevail were the order revoked. Further, we indicated that we normally will notify the Commission of our findings. We note that, as provided in the Sunset Policy Bulletin at section II.B.3.b, the Department normally will provide the Commission the higher of the margin the Department otherwise would have reported to the Commission or the most recent margin for that company adjusted to account for the Department's findings on duty absorption. The Department found in the 1995/96 review that Dofasco, Stelco, and CCC absorbed duties, and, in the 1997/98 review that Stelco and CCC absorbed duties.(16) Consistent with our stated policy we adjusted the rates for Stelco and CCC to reflect our duty absorption findings. Because the adjusted rates are not higher than the rates we would otherwise report, we will report the rates from the original investigation.(17) As such, the Department will report to the Commission the margins likely to prevail if the order were revoked, as contained in the Preliminary Results of Review section of this decision memo. Preliminary Results of Review: We determine that revocation of the antidumping duty order on corrosion-resistant carbon steel flat products from Canada would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping at the following percentage weighted-average margins: _______________________________________________________________ Manufacturer/exporters Margins (percent) _______________________________________________________________ Dofasco 11.71 Stelco 22.70 All Others 18.71 _______________________________________________________________ Recommendation: Based on our analysis of the comments received, we recommend adopting all of the above positions. If these recommendations are accepted, we will publish the Preliminary Results of Review in the Federal Register. AGREE____ DISAGREE____ ___________________________ Joseph A. Spetrini Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration _____________________ (Date) _______________________________________________________________ footnotes: 1. See Antidumping Duty Orders: Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products and Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Canada, 58 FR 44162 (August 19, 1993). 2. See Amended Final Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Antidumping Orders: Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products and Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Canada, 60 FR 49582 (September 26, 1995). 3. See Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel flat Products and Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Canada; Final Results of Antidumping Administrative Reviews, 61 FR 13815 (March 28, 1996). 4. See Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Canada: Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 62 FR 44105 (August 19, 1997). 5. See Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Canada and Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Canada: Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 63 FR 27258 (May 18, 1998). 6. See Corrosion Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products and Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate form Canada: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews and Determination to Revoke in Part, 64 FR 2173 (January 13, 1999). 7. See Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products and Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Canada: Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews and Determination to Revoke in Part, 64 FR 7622 (February 16, 1999). 8. See Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel flat Products and Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Canada; Final Results of Antidumping Administrative Reviews and Determination Not to Revoke in Part, 65 FR 9243 (February 24, 2000). 9. See Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Canada and Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Canada: Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 63 FR 27258 (May 18, 1998). 10. See Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel flat Products and Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Canada; Final Results of Antidumping Administrative Reviews and Determination Not to Revoke in Part, 65 FR 9243 (February 24, 2000). 11. See Initiation of Five Year ("Sunset") Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders or Investigations of Carbon Steel Plates and Flat Products, 64 FR 47767 (September 1, 1999). 12. See September 24, 1999, Request for an Extension to File Rebuttal Comments in the Sunset Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders: A-602-803; A-351-817; C-351-818, A-122- 822, A-122-823, A-405-802, A-588-826, A-421-804, A-455-802, A-485- 803, C-401-401, C-401-804, C-401-805, from Valerie S. Schindler, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, to Jeffrey A. May, Office of Policy. 13. See September 30, 1999, Letter from Jeffrey A. May, Director, Office of Policy to Valerie S. Schindler, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. 14. See October 20, 1999, Memorandum for Jeffrey A. May, Re: Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Flat Plate from Canada: Adequacy of Respondent Interested Party Response to the Notice of Initiation. 15. See Extension of Time Limit for Final Results of Expedited Five- Year Reviews, 64 FR 71726 (December 22, 1999). 16. We note the Court of International Trade in SKF USA, Inc. v. United States, Court No. 99-08-00473 (March 22, 2000), found that the Department lacks the authority to conduct duty absorption inquiries with respect to certain transition orders; however, the Court decision is not final and conclusive. 17. See March 17, 2000, Memo to File: Calculation of the Net Antidumping Duties: Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Canada; Final Results.